Preference by Linguistic Signification in Ibn Rushd al-Hafid A Study of Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid: A Foundational and Applied Study in Islamic Legal Theory

Abstract

This study reconstructs the method of Abu al-Walid Ibn Rushd al-Hafid (d. 595/1198) for preferring one linguistic signification over another, as it operates in his Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid — a work that combines comparative jurisprudence with a theoretical analysis of the causes of juristic disagreement. The problem addressed is to uncover the rules Ibn Rushd employed when linguistic significations conflict or when several linguistic possibilities compete, and to test the coherence between his juristic applications and the theoretical framework set out in the book's introduction and in al-Daruri fi Usul al-Fiqh. The research adopts an inductive method in gathering applications, an analytical method in dissecting the structure of preference, and a comparative method in weighing his choices against the positions of jurists and the doctrines of legal theorists especially al-Ghazali, whose al-Mustasfa Ibn Rushd abridged. The study concludes that Ibn Rushd built his linguistic preference upon an interconnected system whose principal rules are: giving priority to explicit wording over the argument from silence (dalil al-khitab); giving priority, in principle, to general wording over that argument, while noting that both general terms and implied meanings vary in strength; acting upon the apparent meaning until a diverting indicator appears; preferring literal over figurative usage at the outset, while allowing the figurative to prevail when usage and context render it more apparent; taking morphological forms, particles, technical religious usage and context into account; and refusing to apply mechanically the rule that an unqualified text is to be construed in light of a qualified one when stronger indicators oppose it. It further shows that the objectives of the law and the removal of hardship do not function for him as substitutes for signification, but as preferential indicators or disciplined diverters of the apparent meaning, and that he suspends judgement when significations are evenly balanced a methodological suspension, not an inability. The study proposes a "Rushdian ladder" of linguistic preference in eleven procedural steps, compares it with the frameworks of the legal theorists, and indicates its usefulness for teaching ijtihad and for contemporary studies in legal semantics.