From Separation of Powers to Fusion of Powers: A Critique of Nigeria's Application of Baron De Montesquieu's Principle of Separation of Powers

Abstract

Baron de Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers is a foundational principle of liberal democracy, advocating the division of governmental functions, legislative, executive, and judicial to prevent tyranny and safeguard liberty. Nigeria, having accepted to practice the presidential system of government, logically adopted this principle of checks and balances in its 1999 Constitution to ensure mutual accountability and limit power abuse among the three arms of government. The motivation for this study stems from the observed practical divergence from this theoretical ideal in Nigeria, which often exhibits a "fusion of powers" rather than a strict separation. The problem that this work seeks to address is the consistent mal-application and abuse of these constitutional provisions. This leads to persistent conflicts and disruptions in governance, marked by partisan interests, perceived executive dominance, and instances of legislative overreach, impacting critical processes like budget approval and appointments. Such constitutional aberrations impede democratic consolidation and foster political instability. This paper's objectives are to critically examine the extent to which separation of powers contributes to democracy in Nigeria, determine the factors affecting its successful application, and ascertain how checks and balances contribute to its effective management. The paper employs the content-analytic method.