Pragmalinguistics and it's Difficulties

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Abstract. *In this article, it is considered that folklore is an art that has been collected by a certain nation over the centuries, embodies the national characteristics of that nation, and whose origins go back to ancient times. It is emphasized that each of its types reflects the feelings, character, dreams, customs and traditions of the creators, as well as from the living climate to the nature. Information is provided about proverbs, one of the folk oral genres that have such characteristics. National-cultural features specific to proverbs in the translation of proverbs are also highlighted.*
Key words: *Pragmalinguistics, proverb, translation, national-cultural words, folk art.*

In cross-examination, questions are used by counsel as powerful tools to control witness testimonies. In bilingual courtrooms, conveying the subtlety in the use of questions from one language to another is crucial for all participants. However, achieving a high level of accuracy is extremely demanding due to the intricacy of courtroom discourse and the complexity of interpreting in such an institutional setting. Drawing on a moot court exercise at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, this study investigates the most common pragmalinguistic challenges for trainee interpreters in achieving accuracy when interpreting cross-examination questions from English to Mandarin. Findings show that it can be challenging to produce pragmatically accurate renditions: Mandarin interpretations have an overall weakened illocutionary force compared to the original English questions. In particular, declaratives, reported speech declaratives, modal interrogatives, and tag questions are found to be difficult to interpret into Mandarin. This paper also explores the way the illocutionary force of the interpreted questions deviates from the original and the possible causes for this shift. Findings point to the need to enhance pragmatic competence among trainee interpreters, which in turn will require specialised training for interpreters working in legal settings.

It is known that the communicative interaction interacts during the contingency. This can also be divided into several stages: establishing contacts, continuing and stopping communication. During the first set-up period, language and patterns of greetings are used; at the second stage, attention will be paid to issues that are important for stakeholders. Their interests are clearly defined and emotionally discussed, and the participants express their affection for each other. This is a general scheme of our involvement. In fact, the presence can be shorter. For example, in the informal situation, the first or third stage may even be ignored. Of course, it depends on whether the participants are acquainted, intimate, interested, or casual, temporary partners. The correct understanding or misinterpretation of the message delivered by one of the participants relates to several factors.

For purposes of inquiry and exposition, we may proceed to distinguish 'grammatical competence' from 'pragmatic competence', restricting the first to the knowledge of form and meaning and the second to knowledge of conditions and manner of appropriate use, in conformity with various purposes. Thus we may think of language as an instrument that can be put to use. The grammar of the language characterizes the instrument, determining intrinsic physical and semantic properties of

every sentence. The grammar thus expresses grammatical competence. A system of rules and principles constituting pragmatic competence determines how the tool can effectively be put to use.

Most pragmaticians would disagree with this componential presentation because unlike many other tools, language is not a 'thing' which leads an independent and unchanging life once it has been 'made'. It requires constant adaptations to different purposes and circumstances of use. And for a descriptive account of the meaning and an explanatory account of the form of linguistic entities, it is often necessary to refer to conditions of their appropriate use. Strictly speaking, every aspect of competence is part of one's competence to perform. In other words, also the so-called 'grammatical competence' determines the way in which language gets used. Thus the form/meaning vs.use opposition is not unproblematic. While maintaining the contrast, Morris also recognizes this issue when introducing the notion of a 'pragmatic rule.

This formulation, which places everything that syntax and semantics cannot cope with in the custody of pragmatics, has no doubt contributed to the 'waste basket' view of pragmatics.

In the 'Anglo-American tradition' pragmatics sometimes looks like a repository of extremely interesting but separable topics such as deixis, implicature, presupposition, speech acts and politeness relevance. More often than not, theoretical unity is provided in spite of the many points of contract between these various topics. Thus, speech act rules are frequently specific applications of the more general conversational maxims. Grice's account of conversational implicatures and Searle's definition of indirect speech acts are very similar. Moreover, in his account of the 'illocutionary derivation' needed to arrive at the meaning of an indirect speech act, Searle makes explicit reference to the principles of conversational cooperation. Furthermore, there is a fundamental sense in which background information and presupposition are synonymous, though the latter acquired a number of more restricted meanings. And one of the main early definitions of presuppositions advanced in the literature crucially depends on functions of language which are generally discussed in terms of speech acts [6, 112].

The numerous identifiable points of contact have not spontaneously produced coherence in the 'waste basket', though truly powerful examples of theory formation have emerged and though interesting and useful attempts have been made even to reduce pragmatics to a single-principle enterprise. A stumbling block seems to have been the persistent attempt to define pragmatics as an additional component of a theory of language, with its own range of topics or even its own units of analysis.

In the course of our investigations we have been that the division of labor between semantics and pragmatics when it comes to explaining meaning is far from clear-cut. In the case of presupposition, at least, we have seen that it is perhaps not always possible, or desirable, to describe semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning in entirely separate ways, or even to stipulate which aspects of meaning belong to semantics and which to pragmatics. Presuppositions of simpler sentences are not routinely inherited by, or projected on to, the more complex sentences of which the simple sentences can form a part. It is not that presuppositions never survive when expressions that trigger them are embedded into larger units. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't. This presents a potentially very complex set of data to be explained by a semantic theory.

The relevance of the analysis of implicature to micropragmatics is twofold. First, implicature studies account for the further processing of information that has been encoded by the speaker based on his/her presuppositions. Second, in doing the latter, they eventually recognize the contribution implicature makes to the update of the utterance-discourse.

From the analytic standpoint, the explanatory powers of presupposition and implicature are inherently complementary, shedding light on both the speaker and the hearer side of the speech act formation. They are suited to cover, in combination, the whole process of encoding messages by speakers and decoding them by their hearers. This process is essentially a continuum, where making a presupposition paves the way for the utterance before it takes on a linguistic form, in which the presupposition is lexically or non-lexically salient. From that point on, i.e. the point of making the utterance by the speaker, the recovery of the implicature by the hearer may begin – of course, if the hearer senses a prompt to search for it/them. The inference of the implicature, whether in accordance

with the speaker's expectations or not, finalizes the entire process, thus updating the status of the interaction and creating a new contextual basis on which to build presuppositions for further utterances in the exchange. The cycle in question corroborates the dynamic view of context and endorses the intrinsic relativity of the micro-macro dichotomy. While the update takes place, technically speaking, 'within the utterance', its effect is on the prospective discourse.

The classificatory, controlling power of the speech act is further reflected in its network of felicity conditions, i.e. the conditions that underlie a successful, logical, 'felicitous' production of different acts. For example, a speaker cannot make a successful order if he or she does not sincerely want the order to be followed, or if he or she deems the hearer incapable of following it. These two felicity conditions are excellent illustrations of the connection that holds between the concepts of the speech act and the other 'micropragmatic' concepts – a relation we have postulated at the beginning of this subsection. The speaker's awareness of cognitive and social context obtaining at the moment of producing a speech act gives rise to pragmatic presuppositions underlying the utterance that contains this act. Then, once the act is accomplished, the speaker's presuppositions can be assessed against the effectiveness of implicatures they helped to create.

Presupposition can be defined as a mechanism whereby the speaker addresses a body of knowledge and experience, involving both linguistic and non-linguistic contexts, which he or she assumes to be common to him/herself and the hearer. The assumption of the existence of the shared knowledge may cause the speaker not to grammaticalize it in the utterance. This characterization takes presuppositionto be a phenomenon lying at several intersections: the encoded and the assumed, the semantic and the pragmatic, the linguistic and the non-linguistic.

Traditionally, the more a presupposition was linked with a lexical item or a linguistic construction generating it, the more it was treated as a semantic phenomenon; the other cases deemed 'pragmatic' and worth less attention precisely because of the absence of fixed language forms responsible for enacting particular presuppositions. This view has produced multiple typologies of presupposition, based on its embedding in lexicogrammatical forms called presupposition triggers. Furthermore, a number of properties have been assigned to presuppositions, including cancellability and constancy under negation.

Conclusion

Ultimately, there are two types of intentions in language communication: 1) the speaker's initial approach; 2) a suddenly emerged situation later. It should also be noted that the intent is adaptive, inconstancy. In the end, it is lawful for each of the participants to have their own objective in each particular situation and to try to harmonize the story with their own approach. The reason is that each participant has the goal of speaking effectively. Thus, the bases for describing the concept of the participatory approach can be summarized as follows: 1) the aim of the intentional intentions is direct and indirect; 2) implication and explicit intensities due to introspection or intentional representation of the intention during the conversation; 3) intentional (mentally) intentions, which are carried out due to the motivation of any actors to act; 4) positive and negative intensities in terms of emotional impact on participants; 5) intensification of the short-term or event-related events, due to the cause of development or development. Thus, intention is an important factor that stimulates the realization of any cooperative situation.

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