

## **The International Stance on Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh's Movement and its Repercussions on Iran and the Region**

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**Abstract:** In the early 1950s, Iran witnessed profound political transformations led by Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, culminating in his project to nationalize Iranian oil in 1951. This decision triggered a severe international crisis and reshaped the balance of power in the Middle East amidst the escalating Cold War. International stances towards Mosaddegh's government varied. The United States adopted a cautious position and a tendency towards mediation during the administration of President Harry Truman. The Soviet Union also maintained a cautious stance, while some Third World countries expressed sympathy for the Iranian move, viewing it as a model for liberation from colonial domination.

### **Introduction**

The movement led by Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh (1951-1953) is considered one of the most significant political transformations in modern Iranian history. It was linked to his national project of nationalizing the Iranian oil industry, a decision that shocked the international order, particularly Britain and the United States, which controlled Iranian oil wealth directly and indirectly. This movement had multiple implications, not only for Iranian domestic politics but also for international relations, where economic, political, and strategic dimensions intertwined, revealing the extent of international competition for influence in the Middle East during the Cold War.

The importance of this research stems from its attempt to uncover the nature of international stances toward Mosaddegh's movement, analyze its motives and determinants, and understand its repercussions on the Iranian domestic scene and the international landscape.

The research is significant because it elucidates the historical and political background preceding Mosaddegh's movement, analyzes the international position on the oil nationalization decision, and draws conclusions about the implications of these positions for Iran and the region.

This research employs a historical-analytical approach, tracing events and connecting them to international and regional circumstances. The research covers the period from 1951, the nationalization of oil and the rise of Mossadegh, until 1953, the fall of his government in a coup.

### **Chapter One: The Historical Background of Mossadegh's Movement**

#### **Section One: The Political Situation in Iran Before Mossadegh**

The period following World War II witnessed numerous changes, both internationally and within Iran, which significantly impacted the relationship between the Iranian government and other world powers.

Among the most important international changes were:

1. The Allied entry into southern Iran to protect military supplies destined for the Soviet Union, which made the new Shah, Mohammad Reza, realize the importance of Iranian oil and the Persian Gulf.

2. Japan's successive victories in 1942 in the Far East, severing communications with the United States and preventing oil supplies from reaching the Allies. Simultaneously, Italy blocked British oil shipments via the Mediterranean, leaving Iran as the sole oil supplier to Allied forces in the East.<sup>1</sup>
3. In July 1943, the United States established the Petroleum Reserve Authority to acquire oil-rich areas outside the United States and obtain new oil concessions.<sup>(2)</sup>
4. The emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States as superpowers at the end of World War II, with America seeing itself as the legitimate heir to the empire

Britain's involvement in the crises between Iran and the Iranian oil company prompted its intervention. As for internal Iranian changes, under the new Shah, the country witnessed greater political freedoms and a more open and difficult-to-control atmosphere. The regime was unable to suppress the masses or disperse the religious and political gatherings that were held publicly and which openly criticized the government and the Shah.<sup>(3)</sup> The amnesty granted to political prisoners by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1941, early in his reign, had a profound impact on the formation of the communist Tudeh Party. This party quickly gained numerous supporters among labor union members, junior government employees, students, intellectuals, and political elites. The Tudeh Party became a tool in the hands of the Soviet Union to exert pressure on the Iranian government during negotiations concerning oil concessions. Alongside the Tudeh Party, other nationalist parties and movements emerged, free from the domination of foreign and official domestic powers. These groups supported Mohammad Mosaddegh, the Iranian Prime Minister.<sup>(4)</sup>

## **Section Two: Economic Conditions and the Importance of Oil**

The competition between the oil companies of the three countries—the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain—to obtain oil concessions in Iran led to internal unrest, including several changes of government. The Tudeh Party also attacked British oil installations and organized demonstrations in support of Soviet rights in Iran. This prompted the Iranian government, headed by Mohammad Saeed, to issue a decree in September 1944 postponing the granting of oil concessions to any foreign company until the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran. However, this did not prevent continued pressure on the Iranian government, which led Mohammad Mosaddegh—a member of parliament and later prime minister—to propose a law prohibiting the prime minister or any government official from entering into negotiations regarding oil concessions with representatives of foreign governments or companies without prior parliamentary approval. This law was passed by parliament in 1944. . In 1947, the Soviet Union renewed its demands for renewed negotiations regarding oil.<sup>(5)</sup> However, Parliament strongly opposed this and passed a law in 1947 stipulating that Iran should explore and exploit its oil resources with its own capital, and if it was deemed necessary to use foreign experts, they should be brought in from neutral countries. This law also stipulated that the Iranian government should enter into negotiations and take appropriate measures to restore all rights that had been taken from the Iranian people, especially those related to oil concessions in the south of the country. Iranian Prime Minister Abdolhossein Hozheir saw this as an opportune moment to extract further concessions from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In September 1948, he submitted a memorandum to the company accusing it of

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(1) Muhammad Daoud, *Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1950-1954): A Documentary Study*, published research, *An-Najah University Journal*, Volume 37, 2023, p. 1708.

(2) Nouri Abdul Hamid, *The Political History of Oil Concessions in Iraq 1925-1951*, Beirut, n.d., p. 343.

(3) Amal Al-Subki, *\*A History of Iran Between Two Revolutions 1906-1979\**, Kuwait, Alam Al-Ma'rifah, n.d., p. 182.

<sup>4</sup> Nazim Younis Al-Zawi, *The Political History of Oil Concessions 1901-1951*, Baghdad, Dar Dijla, 2010, p. 171.

<sup>5</sup> Abdul Majeed Abdul Hameed Al-Ani, *The Policy of the United States of America towards Iran 1941-1947*, PhD dissertation, University of Baghdad, 1991, p. 274.

failing to uphold the agreement signed between them in 1933, particularly the clauses concerning the employment of Iranian workers and the low government profits compared to oil prices at the time.<sup>(6)</sup>

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) entered into new negotiations with the Iranian government. Finance Minister Abbas Kalashian represented the government, while Neville Cass represented AIOC. The negotiations centered on three main points: increasing taxes, reducing the number of foreign employees working for AIOC, and discussing the prices of petroleum products sold in the domestic market. Notably, the Iranian position was firm, rejecting several of the company's proposals, including an increase in annual government taxes.<sup>(7)</sup>

After numerous rounds of negotiations, the two parties reached a new agreement on July 17, 1949, known as the "Supplementary Agreement". The terms of the agreement included increasing Iran's<sup>8</sup> revenue from 4 to 6 shillings per ton of crude oil, and prompting the company to adjust its payment schedule to Iran starting in January 1948, which resulted in a roughly 30% increase in the government's net profits.<sup>(9)</sup>

This agreement was presented to the Iranian parliament on July 19, 1949, a few days before the end of the fifteenth parliamentary session, for swift consideration. However, the parliamentary opposition obstructed the review and sought to postpone its discussion until the sixteenth parliamentary session<sup>10</sup>, held in 1950. During this session, a parliamentary committee known as the "Oil Committee," chaired by Mohammad Mosaddegh, was formed. This committee quickly rejected the supplementary agreement. However, the then Prime Minister, Ali Razmara—known for his pro-Western stance—declared his adherence to the supplementary agreement, which angered members of parliament<sup>11</sup>. The situation between the two sides escalated into open conflict, with parliament taking the first step by deciding to return the oil issue to the parliamentary Oil Committee. However, both sides backed down after being warned by the United States against taking such a step, which would increase the number of members of the National Front and the opposition, rallying public support around them and giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to infiltrate Iran. Therefore, Washington sought to intervene directly in the crisis by offering several proposals, including the need to coordinate and agree with the British on policies toward Iran, and to provide immediate economic aid to Iran in order to appease public opinion. Matters took a dangerous turn, especially after the Prime Minister's speech to Parliament on March 3, 1951, in which he strongly opposed the idea of nationalizing oil that had been proposed by the National Front<sup>12</sup>. This further exacerbated tensions between the government and the opposition, prompting the public to take to the streets in demonstrations in support of Mohammad Mosaddegh and the National Front. As the situation rapidly deteriorated, the representative of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company presented a new offer to the Prime Minister, proposing a 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement as a suitable solution to end the crisis. However, this offer came too late. Before Razmara could discuss the offer with members of the Iranian parliament, he was assassinated on March 7, 1951, by a young Iranian man named Khalil Tahamsab<sup>13</sup>. To incite the Iranian public, Ayatollah Kashani<sup>14</sup> ordered his

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<sup>6</sup> Nazim Younis Al-Zawi, previous source, p. 209.

<sup>7</sup> F.O 371/823061950 p. 2

<sup>8</sup> Anthony Simpson, *The Seven Sisters, Big Oil and the World They Created*, translated by Sami Hashem, Beirut, no.p., 1976, p. 175.

<sup>9</sup> Homa Katouzian, *Mossadegh and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, translated by Tayeb Al-Hosni, Lebanon, Jadawel Publishing and Distribution, p. 117

<sup>10</sup> Homa Katouzian, previous source, p. 122.

<sup>11</sup> Ruhollah Ramadan, *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973*, translated by Ali Hussein Fayyad and Abdul Majeed Judi, Basra, Lamat, 1984, p. 214.

<sup>12</sup> (F.R.U.S), Document2, 1951, p.5\_6

<sup>13</sup> Taher Khalaf Al-Bakka, *Internal Developments in Iran 1941-1951*, Baghdad, House of Wisdom, 2002, p. 272.

<sup>14</sup> Abu al-Qasim al-Kashani (1882-1963): One of the religious leaders in Iran who fled from Iran to Iraq in 1921 after being sentenced to death for his anti-British colonialism stances and his opposition to the Shah of Iran. In 1950 he returned to Iran and became a member of the Iranian parliament. See Ahmed al-Mawsili, *Encyclopedia of Islamic Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey*, Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies 2005, p. 370.

followers to stage widespread popular demonstrations throughout the country calling for the nationalization of Iranian oil <sup>15</sup>.

### **Section Three: Nationalization of Iranian Oil**

The aspirations of members of parliament and the Iranian public had moved beyond mere discussion of profit-sharing to the complete nationalization of the country's oil sector <sup>16</sup>. On March 15, 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh presented a proposal to the parliament to nationalize Iranian oil, capitalizing on the demonstrations calling for nationalization. He asked the representatives to approve it. After the parliament adopted the proposal, it was referred to the relevant committee to study the legal and executive procedures that would ensure the implementation of the nationalization decision <sup>17</sup>.

The Iranian government, headed by Hossein Ala, who was appointed prime minister after the assassination of Ali Razmara, could not continue in office. He resigned on April 28, 1951, after the Iranian parliament insisted on adopting the proposal to nationalize Iranian oil, while his plan included negotiating with the oil company on profit-sharing, assigning some key responsibilities and positions to Iranian employees, and accepting Iranian managers on the company's board of directors <sup>18</sup>.

Mohammad Mosaddegh was appointed Prime Minister, thus becoming one of the strongest supporters of the oil nationalization project in Iran<sup>19</sup>. On May 1, 1951, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ratified the law nationalizing the oil sector, abolishing the concession granted to the foreign oil company, and establishing the National Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh implemented the nationalization by seizing control of the company's headquarters and offices, confiscating its documents, monitoring its personnel, and directly overseeing the government's receipt of the company's revenues <sup>20</sup>.

It appears that the reasons for the swift nationalization of the oil sector were numerous, primarily the deteriorating economic conditions in Iran, the United States' delay in approving economic aid, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's procrastination in resolving outstanding issues with the Iranian government, particularly those related to the equitable distribution of revenues. This fueled nationalist sentiment and spurred public support for the National Front to eradicate corruption from the country <sup>21</sup>.

## **Chapter Two: The International Stance on Mossadegh's Government and the Nationalization of Oil**

### **Section One: The British Stance**

The decision to nationalize oil came as a great surprise and a severe shock to the British government. Such a decision meant losing its largest foreign asset, which would negatively impact its balance of payments. Iranian oil was a major source of dollars, which served as a financial buffer, helping Britain overcome the crises that emerged in the post-war economy. Furthermore, the decline in the value of the pound sterling would lead to a decrease in British foreign currency reserves, which in turn would weaken British purchasing power. Noting that the contract could not be legally revoked until 1993, Britain sent a protest note to the Iranian government regarding the Iranian parliament's decision to nationalize the oil industry. The British government emphasized that it could not stand idly by in the face of what threatened the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and London demanded that the Iranian parliament reverse its position <sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Iyad Kazem Jassim Al-Alwani, Britain-Iran Crisis over Oil Agreements 1933-1951, *Journal of the Faculty of Education, Egypt*, Volume 23, Issue 4, p. 176.

<sup>16</sup> Hussein Karim Al-Jaf, *Encyclopedia of the Political History of Iran*, Volume 4, Beirut, Arab House for Encyclopedias, 2008, p. 185.

<sup>17</sup> Iyad Kazem Jassim Al-Alwani, previous source, 176.

<sup>18</sup> Hussein Karim Al-Jaf, previous source, p. 187.

<sup>19</sup> Al-Alwani, the previous source, p. 178.

<sup>20</sup> Rabi' Haider Al-Mousawi, Hussein Mohsen Hashem, The Impact of the British-Iranian Conflict on Anglo-American Relations 1951-1953, *Al-Qadisiyah Journal of Arts and Sciences*, Al-Qadisiyah University, Volume 17, Issue 3, 2017, p. 135.

<sup>21</sup> Muhammad Al-Daoud, previous source, 1711.

<sup>22</sup> Muhammad Dawood, the previous source, p. 1712.

Britain initially tried to deal with the Iranian decision to nationalize oil by using diplomacy in an attempt to reach a suitable solution with the Iranian government. During its work in Iran, the company was able to drill six high-yield oil wells, and they built a huge oil refinery in Abadan with a production capacity of 24 million tons per year. The company was able to equip ports for oil tankers and built housing for more than ten thousand workers, due to the size of the investment that the company had in Iran <sup>23</sup>.

Basil Jackson, vice chairman of the board of directors of the oil company, offered the Iranian government a settlement of the dispute with the British company. This settlement involved paying £3 million, with the company continuing to manage the oil industry in Iran on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company, which the Iranian government had established to replace the original oil company after nationalization. However, the Iranian government rejected this offer. <sup>24</sup>

The reason for the hardening of the Iranian national government's position and its rejection of the British company's proposal was the strength of the popular opposition mobilized by Kashani and his supporters, who demanded the nationalization of oil, in addition to Mohammad Mosaddegh's policy of wanting to continue implementing the nationalization decision for which his government was elected. This formed the basic and most important element in creating the Mosaddegh-Kashani alliance. However, the British oil company's ability and great capabilities in managing the oil production sector and its ability to obstruct the nationalization decision were not taken into account. Britain worked to place restrictions on the Iranians to stop oil extraction and stop transportation and refining operations by instructing the company's staff not to cooperate with the Iranian government, represented by the management of the National Iranian Oil Company. They withdrew the British experts and technicians who could carry out oil extraction work and operate the oil refinery in Abadan and agreed with international companies to ban the export of Iranian oil, while they were able to extract and refine it through the remaining foreign and Iranian staff of the company <sup>25</sup>.

Britain began threatening military intervention to seize control of the oil wells, a move that alarmed the United States and prompted it to intervene to persuade Britain to abandon the military option. The US feared that such intervention would open the door for Soviet intervention in Iranian affairs, a prospect America viewed as a direct threat not only to Iran but to the entire region and the Middle East. <sup>26</sup>

Relations between the Iranian government and the British government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) became increasingly complex, especially after London imposed economic sanctions on Iran and banned the sale of Iranian oil. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company also encouraged its employees to resign and threatened mass resignations. This prompted the Iranian government to submit a draft anti-sabotage law to parliament for ratification. The law stipulated prison sentences ranging from six months to life imprisonment, or even the death penalty, for anyone contributing to the cessation of oil production. However, the government quickly withdrew the law under American pressure. In an attempt to officially de-escalate the crisis and facilitate indirect negotiations between Tehran and London, US President Truman proposed sending his special assistant, Averil Harriman, as an envoy<sup>27</sup>. Harriman's delegation arrived in Tehran on July 15th and held its first meeting with the Iranian side on July 17th. During this meeting, Mohammad Mosaddegh told the American envoy that the only way out of the crisis was to reach a settlement that aligned with the Nine Points Law (the nationalization law), which would entail British recognition of the nationalization. The American envoy rejected this, emphasizing that the dispute between This could have disastrous consequences for both sides, negatively impacting the Iranian economy. 'This would

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<sup>23</sup> Richard Ockons, *The Oil Barons*, translated by Younes Shahin, Beirut, Modern Printing Center, DZT, 365.

<sup>24</sup> Richard O'Kons, previous source, 367

<sup>25</sup> Hassanein Abdul Kadhim Ajja, *The Experience of Nationalizing Iranian Oil 1951-1953 Between Internal Challenges and External Pressures (A Study in the Documents of the Iraqi Royal Court)*, Lark Journal of Philosophy, Linguistics and Social Sciences, University of Wasit, Issue 9, 2012, p. 232.

<sup>26</sup> Muhammad Dawood, previous source, 1712

<sup>27</sup> The same source, 1713

increase the growing communist influence in the country, which would benefit the Soviet Union. Hariman suggested to Mohammad Mosaddegh, in return, that he hold a direct, pre-arranged meeting with British officials to discuss the oil company crisis, with this meeting to take place without preconditions<sup>28</sup>.

The dire economic conditions under which Iran was suffering, in addition to British and American pressure, contributed to changing the position of the Iranian Prime Minister and the Oil Committee. They agreed to negotiate with the British side without preconditions. Despite the concessions offered by Tehran, London insisted that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company be allowed to fully resume its operations as a gesture of goodwill before any negotiations began. This was rejected by the Iranian Prime Minister and the Oil Committee, as it would effectively mean acknowledging a court ruling, which threatened to complicate the situation<sup>29</sup>.

This prompted Hariman to go to London to persuade British officials not to impose preconditions before entering into talks, arguing that missing this opportunity would have serious consequences for both sides. The British delegation arrived in Tehran on August 4, 1951, consisting of Richard Stokes and Lord Privy Seal as representatives of the The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, along with... Kington, the director of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and four other officials, were part of the Stokes delegation. The Iranian delegation was headed by Finance Minister Ali Farasta, Deputy Finance Minister (Hasibi), Education Minister (Sanjabi), and four other members of the parliamentary oil committee. The Stokes mission aimed to obtain firsthand information about the situation there. It began its work with a tour of the Abadan region on August 7th. The first round of negotiations between the two sides began on August 12th, with Stokes presenting general, unspecified demands. Negotiations between the Iranians and the British stalled without reaching a significant result. Stokes returned to London and promised to return to Tehran when the Iranian government was ready to negotiate the British demands<sup>30</sup>.

## **Second Section: The United States' Position on Oil Nationalization**

The United States secretly supported Mossadegh through its ambassador in Tehran. The US held a positive view of Iran, supporting its right to nationalize its domestic oil, attempting to mediate an agreement between Britain and Iran, and praising Mossadegh and his democratic leanings<sup>31</sup>. The US intervened only minimally to resolve the problem before it escalated because President Truman believed the most important thing was to support a popular Iranian force opposed to communism. However, when the first serious crisis erupted on June 10, 1951, and Iran requested \$100 million in US aid, it received only a \$25 million loan from the United States<sup>32</sup>. The United States quickly changed its stance because the nationalization decision posed a threat to the international oil monopoly comprised of seven major oil companies, five of which were American. These companies opposed the US government and decided to impose an immediate embargo on Iranian oil, joining forces with the British company and increasing their own oil production and sales by boosting pumping from Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Saudi oil fields. The major American oil companies operating in the region viewed the events in Iran with concern, as an Iranian victory would inevitably incite unrest in neighboring regions. On July 7, 1951, after Mossadegh announced Iran's withdrawal from negotiations following the Hague Court's ruling on July 5, 1951, that Iranian oil exploitation should continue—based on the lawsuit filed by the British company—President Truman attempted to resolve the crisis and sent his technical advisor to Tehran. A member of the British cabinet also arrived with him, but they were unable to reach an acceptable compromise.<sup>33</sup> Following the failure of Harriman's mission, British officials

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<sup>28</sup> Muhammad Dawood, previous source, p. 1713

<sup>29</sup> The same source, pp. 1713-1714.

<sup>30</sup> Muhammad Dawood, the previous source, 1714.

<sup>31</sup> Wissam Ali Thabit, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Diyala Magazine, Issue 30, College of Education, University of Diyala, 2008, p. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Amna Ibrahim Al-Qarm, American Foreign Policy towards Iran, Al-Quds University, 2007, p. 31.

<sup>33</sup> Abdul Rahman Muhammad Al-Nuaimi, 2nd ed., The Struggle for the Arabian Gulf, Beirut, Dar Al-Kunuz Al-Adabiyya, 1962, p. 32

began preparing a plan to invade southwestern Iran and seize its oil fields. When they informed the United States of this plan, Truman informed the British Prime Minister that the United States would not support him in this move. He urged him to continue negotiations and forced him to abandon the invasion plan. The US also declared that it would not support any action against Iran, as it would give the Soviets a pretext for advancing from the north and then annexing Iran to the Soviet camp. In October 1951, Mossadegh traveled to the United States to inform the Security Council of the oil crisis at the invitation of American officials to visit Washington. They welcomed him and offered their readiness to mediate to resolve the conflict, but all these efforts failed. The United States also pledged to compensate for the lost quantities of Iranian oil by pumping from other regions. American companies supplied the countries allied with the United States with oil whose flow was affected by the embargo. They distributed more than (46) forty-six million barrels of oil to those countries, which is approximately 20% of Iran's oil production for the year 1950. Iranian oil production fell from 666 thousand barrels in 1950 to 20 thousand barrels in 1952. Thus, the United States succeeded in compensating for the oil shortage, stabilizing the oil market, and playing an important role in consolidating the embargo, weakening the Iranian economy, and undermining part of Mossadegh's popularity<sup>34</sup>. In October 1952 While work was gradually resuming at the Abadan refinery thanks to the intervention of Iranian technicians, the National Iranian Oil Company announced that its tankers would receive protection and escort from the Iranian navy until they left the Gulf.

Truman stated that Mossadegh would be mistaken if he believed time was on his side <sup>35</sup>. When Mossadegh turned to the United States, requesting \$120 million in financial aid due to Iran's economic decline and seeking contracts to purchase Iranian oil, he sent a personal letter to US President Dwight Eisenhower in May 1953 regarding the Iranian issue. The United States refused to cooperate with or assist Iran, making it clear to everyone that the US was not allied with Mossadegh. Eisenhower added a warning, saying that he hoped the Iranian government would reach an agreement before it was too late, and that it must do everything in its power to prevent any deterioration of the situation. Eisenhower warned Mossadegh that the United States would freeze its aid to Iran if Mossadegh did not make a reasonable settlement to the crisis, which included protecting their interests against the growing communist influence resulting from his cooperation with the Iranian Communist Party <sup>36</sup>.

### **Third Section: The United States' Stance on Mossadegh's Government:**

The United States helped Mossadegh assume power, hoping to use him to end the British monopoly on Iranian oil. However, Mossadegh's policies aroused US suspicions because he lacked caution in his dealings with the communists, especially after they noticed that, following his successful nationalization, he began to noticeably try to manipulate American interests for his own benefit. Furthermore, he refused to reach a solution that would mitigate British anger and protect their interests while simultaneously allowing the Americans to become significant partners in the exploitation of Iranian oil. This was evident when Mossadegh rejected the joint memorandum sent to him in September 1952 by Truman and Churchill, which proposed a settlement to the crisis between Iran and Britain. The dispute was before the International Court of Justice, whereby the court would determine the compensation due to the company, negotiations would establish how the global market could purchase Iranian oil, and the United States would provide an immediate loan of ten million dollars <sup>37</sup>. To help it continue, and despite this clear policy of Mossadegh, American policy under Truman did not want to intervene militarily in Iran, but rather favored diplomatic solutions to resolve the crisis. This is what happened with Truman, who refused Britain's request to help remove Mossadegh's government after Mossadegh, in October 1952, expelled all British diplomats from Iran and closed the British embassy, upon discovering that British agents were conspiring against his government. At that time, Truman expressed <sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> Palmer, Michael, *The Gulf Guard*, Cairo, Al-Ahram Center for Translation, 1995, p. 71

<sup>35</sup> Abdul Rahman Muhammad, the previous source, p. 32.

<sup>36</sup> Palmer, Michael, previous source, p. 71.

<sup>37</sup> *The Majesty of Ahmad Iran: Between the Crown and the Turban*, First Edition 1989, p. 52

<sup>38</sup> Nabila Mahmoud Dheeb, *American Policy Towards Iran*, Faculty of Arts, Islamic University of Gaza, 2012.

At the time, he sympathized with nationalist movements, such as the one led by Mossadegh, and was reluctant to intervene, as the CIA had never before carried out a government overthrow in Iran, and Truman did not want to be the first to take such action. However, when the US elections resulted in Truman's resignation and Eisenhower's ascension to the presidency in November 1952, the American stance toward the events of the coup in Iran changed completely. During the election period, an agent from British intelligence came to Washington to meet with senior government officials and high-ranking CIA officers. President Eisenhower, despite his inexperience with power, discovered that Mossadegh was employing a new political tactic to secure his survival, which increased the United States' sense of unease and concern about the growing influence of Mossadegh, who was drawing too close to the Iranian communist Tudeh Party. According to what was written in the early days of the Eisenhower administration<sup>39</sup>, Iran would fall into the Soviet orbit during the Tudeh Party's takeover of power. Intensive British propaganda also helped portray Mossadegh as a communist, determined to replace the West with the Soviet Union in the Gulf. This propaganda found a response among American officials, especially given the United States' fear of Iran falling under Soviet influence and the increasing influence of the communist Tudeh Party in Iran. Eisenhower shared the opinion of his senior advisors and administration officials, who worked in the CIA and followed the situation in Iran very carefully, such as Allen Dulles<sup>40</sup>. According to the new American strategy, the US administration decided that Mossadegh had to leave, despite the lack of support from some prominent American figures. When Mossadegh intensified his cooperation with the Iranian Communist Party to secure Soviet support, and began attempting to gain Soviet influence in Iran, US fears of potential Soviet penetration of Iran were renewed. This led them to definitively decide to get rid of Mossadegh before he consolidated his control over Iran, especially after Stalin's statement before his death on March 5, 1953: "Iran will soon fall like a rotten apple into the hands of the Soviets." The coup and the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh strengthened the royalist coalition against him, despite the Shah's initial hesitation. After Mossadegh lost the oil weapon, he wrote a letter to US President Dwight Eisenhower on May 28, 1953, asking him for financial and moral support<sup>41</sup>. Independent companies in the United States also threatened to file a lawsuit against the Seven Sisters (3) on charges of violating antitrust laws and forming illegal alliances, hoping to find in the crisis an opportunity to consolidate their interests in Iran. However, the US administration, after seeing the influence of the communist Tudeh Party in Iran, viewed the situation in Iran from the perspective of the Cold War between the free world and communism. Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and Louie Henderson, the US ambassador in Tehran, met with Princess Ashraf, the Shah's sister, in Switzerland to conspire against Mossadegh and his government. The brigadier general of the Seven Major Oil Companies, known as the Seven Sisters, participated in the conspiracy. These were American and British companies that controlled the global oil market from oil production to refining, transportation, and marketing in the world, and thus dominated half of the world trade<sup>42</sup>.

### **Chapter Three / The Soviet Union and Arab States' Stance on Mossadegh's Movement**

#### **Section One: The Soviet Union's Stance**

The Soviet Union's stance towards Mossadegh's government was supportive, as this decision guaranteed the Soviet Union the absence of any British foreign influence near its borders. Furthermore, it ensured access to its oil needs, free from any influences or other factors imposed by countries it considered rivals along its land borders<sup>43</sup>. This explains the Soviet Union's insistence on opposing the granting of oil exploration concessions in the northern provinces. This Soviet position became clear when the Iranian government granted the Amiraniyan Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Seybound Oil Company, an oil exploration concession in the northeastern part of the country in 1937. The concession covered an area of 100,000 square miles, to be gradually reduced to 100,000 square miles

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<sup>39</sup> Muhammad Hassanein, *The Story of Iran and the Revolution*, Dar Al-Shorouk, 6th Edition, Cairo, 2002 AD, p. 87.

<sup>40</sup> Ali Mohafeza, *Iran Between Nationalism, Revolution, and Persian Identity*, 2013, p. 53

<sup>41</sup> Ali Muhafaza, the previous source, p. 53.

<sup>42</sup> The same source, p. 53.

<sup>43</sup> Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sayyad, *Iran Nationalizes Its Oil*, Al-Thaqafa Newspaper, Issue 641, 9/4/1951, p. 4.

within 15 years. The company was to pay the Iranian government \$4 per ton of oil extracted, in addition to a sum that included 20% of the net profits<sup>44</sup>. The Iranian government aimed, through this concession, to establish an allied force stationed in the north of the country to counter any Soviet threat to Iran. The Iranian option It is moving towards gaining an American alliance that plays a role in Iran<sup>45</sup>. In 1938, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company relinquished its concession due to Soviet opposition to any foreign presence near its borders, in addition to other difficulties the company faced, including the challenges of transporting oil once extracted. This was because constructing pipelines or using tankers would necessitate passing through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession areas or using Soviet territory. These solutions were difficult to accept at the time, forcing the Iranian government to withdraw the concession and grant it to Royal Dutch Shell, a Dutch-British company. Shell was granted the right to construct airports, railways, roads, telegraph lines, and establish its own radio station. This concession was revoked in 1944 as a result of Soviet resistance to granting it<sup>46</sup>.

After the Iranian government nationalized the oil sector, it closed the door to Soviet requests for an oil exploration concession in northern Iran<sup>47</sup>.

## **Section Two: The Arab States' Stance on Mossadegh's Government**

The Arab region, through its press, showed considerable sympathy for Iran regarding its decision to nationalize oil, referring to Mossadegh's movement as the "blessed movement"<sup>48</sup>. The Arab press closely followed the events of the Iranian crisis related to oil nationalization from its inception, paying close attention to the details. This was because Arab interest was linked to their negative feelings and stances towards Britain and its support for Israel, which they perceived as contributing to the Nakba (the Palestinian catastrophe). This sympathy was further fueled by news of the withdrawal of recognition of Israel, as expressed by Ayatollah Kashani, who declared the readiness of the Fedayeen-e Islam group, which he controlled, to sacrifice their lives for this cause<sup>49</sup>.

Iranian recognition of Israel was not official but rather implicit, a de facto recognition. However, it held significant meaning for Israel, as this recognition meant that Iran would not seek military confrontation or participate in any military action against it<sup>50</sup>.

Iran's official political stance on Palestine during its membership in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) favored the establishment of a single federal state encompassing both Jews and Arabs to achieve peace. However, the committee's vote ultimately led to the UN General Assembly adopting the Partition Plan under Resolution 181, issued on January 29, 1947. Less than six months after this resolution, Israel declared its independence<sup>51</sup>.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi bore the responsibility for recognizing the State of Israel and permitted the establishment of international relations with it in the areas of political representation, trade, and public relations<sup>52</sup>.

The Israeli government exploited these relations to facilitate the transfer and emigration of many Iraqi Jews who left Iraq for Iran, which they considered an important transit point for immigration to Israel. This was accomplished via the Iranian national airline during the years 1948-1950<sup>53</sup>.

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<sup>44</sup> Al-Alwani, the previous source, p. 167.

<sup>45</sup> Palmer, Michael, previous source, p. 23.

<sup>46</sup> Al-Alwani, previous source, pp. 169-170

<sup>47</sup> Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sayyad, previous source, 4.

<sup>48</sup> Saad Salem Abu Deih, *The Crisis of the Musaddaq Government with the Major Powers in the Jordanian and Egyptian Press: The Beginning and the End 1951-1953*, Cultural Magazine, University of Jordan, Jordan, Issue 56, 2002, p. 156.

<sup>49</sup> Saad Salem Abu Deih, the same source, p. 155.

<sup>50</sup> Trita Parsi, *Alliance of Common Interests: The Secret Dealings Between Israel, Iran and the United States*, translated by Amin Al-Ayoubi, Beirut, Arab Scientific Publishers, 2008, pp. 16-17.

<sup>51</sup> Trita Barzi, previous source, p. 17.

<sup>52</sup> Mahmoud Shaker, *Islamic History: Contemporary History of Iran and Afghanistan*, Beirut, Islamic Bureau, 1995, p. 79.

<sup>53</sup> Aliyan Muhammad, *American-Iranian Relations After the Second Half of the Twentieth Century*, Berlin, Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Political and Economic Studies, 2017, p. 106

Israel consistently sought to establish a tacit alliance with Iran, in accordance with what is known in Israeli foreign policy as the Ben-Gurion Doctrine. This doctrine is based on the premise that Israel is obligated to forge alliances with neighboring countries, excluding Arab states with which it cannot establish peace. Among the most prominent countries targeted by the Ben-Gurion Doctrine are Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia. Additionally, Israel sought to establish relations and alliances with groups and minorities within Arab countries, such as the Christian communities in Lebanon and the Kurds of Iraq, in order to weaken the Arab bloc against it<sup>54</sup>.

## Conclusion

1. The research suggests that the United States' intervention in the crisis stemmed from its deep fear that the Iranian parliament would implement the nationalization decree, creating a new situation in the Middle East. This could lead some newly oil-rich countries in the region to follow Iran's example, harming the interests of the United States and the West as a whole.
2. The Mossadegh crisis served as an early example of the intertwining of economics and politics within the context of the Cold War.
3. Oil was the primary factor in the British position, while security considerations dominated the American stance in 1953.
4. The overthrow of Mossadegh's government contributed to consolidating Western influence in Iran until the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
5. The crisis became an example of foreign intervention in the affairs of developing countries during the twentieth century.

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