

## **Truth-Value Gaps and the Prosperity Gospel: A Kripkean Possible-Worlds Semantics**

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**Abstract:** This study investigates the intersection of truth-value gaps, modal logic, and the Nigerian Prosperity Gospel, focusing on how semantically indeterminate propositions emerge within faith-based discourse. Truth-value gaps, arising where bivalence fails, are traced from Aristotle's future contingents to Frege's sense-reference distinction and Strawson's presuppositional analysis, demonstrating that propositions may lack truth-values without being meaningless. Kripke's possible-worlds semantics further illuminates how necessity, possibility, and reference operate across accessible worlds, providing a formal framework to analyze religious assertions insulated from empirical falsification. Methodologically, the study employs qualitative approach rooted in analytic philosophy and formal propositional logic, exemplified through the SEMANTIC model, which formalizes seed-faith claims as a fixed conditional,  $(P \bullet S) \rightarrow Q$ , exposing auxiliary spiritual presuppositions and enabling classical truth-functional evaluation. The analysis reveals that Prosperity Gospel statements, such as "I am blessed" or "Your miracle is coming," occupy truth-value gaps when empirical reality fails to instantiate promised outcomes. These gaps are maintained through counterfactual faith-states, deferred fulfillment, and semantic flexibility, demonstrating a modal displacement of actuality by the faith-world ( $w_f$ ). By constructing a complete truth table for  $(P \bullet S) \rightarrow Q$ , the SEMANTIC model shows that only one precise configuration renders the conditional false, thereby restoring logical clarity to rhetorically elastic claims. The study contributes to knowledge by demonstrating that philosophical semantics can critically assess religious language without undermining belief, revealing how linguistic structures sustain hope while obscuring accountability. This inquiry underscores the ethical and cognitive stakes of semantic transparency, offering a framework for understanding the interplay between faith, language, and socio-economic realities.

**Keywords:** Truth-Value Gap, Prosperity Gospel, Modal Logic, SEMANTIC Model, Nigerian Pentecostalism.

### **Introduction**

The notion of a truth-value gap names a philosophical disturbance within the classical commitment to bivalence, the principle that every meaningful proposition must be either true or false. A truth-value gap arises precisely where this commitment falters, where a proposition resists adjudication within the binary logic of affirmation and denial. Its conceptual ancestry is commonly located in Aristotle's sea-battle paradox, a meditation on future contingents that exposes the fragility of bivalence when applied to statements whose truth seems neither presently fixed nor retrospectively determinable. Aristotle's hesitation was not merely logical but metaphysical: it signalled an early recognition that reality itself may not always be exhaustively describable by determinate truth-values.

This intuition was later sharpened within analytic philosophy through sustained engagement with language, reference, and meaning. Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense and reference destabilized

the assumption that meaningful sentences automatically succeed in referring, while P. F. Strawson radicalized this insight by foregrounding the role of presupposition. In his celebrated example; ‘The present King of France is bald’; Strawson argued that the failure of a presupposed background condition does not render the statement false; rather, it deprives the utterance of a truth-value altogether. The proposition misfires, not because it asserts incorrectly, but because it lacks the ontological footing required for truth-evaluation. Truth-value gaps thus emerge not as logical errors but as symptoms of a deeper misalignment between language and world.

The debate underwent a decisive reconfiguration with Saul Kripke’s intervention in modal logic during the 1960s and 1970s. Through Possible-Worlds Semantics, Kripke displaced truth from its confinement to the actual world ( $W_0$ ) and reconceived it as a modal notion evaluated across a structured plurality of possible worlds ordered by accessibility relations. In *Naming and Necessity*, the introduction of rigid designators further complicated the picture by showing that reference can remain fixed even as truth-values vary across worlds. Within this framework, truth-value gaps cease to appear as merely linguistic pathologies; they become metaphysically informative, revealing fractures in the modal architecture through which necessity, possibility, and actuality are negotiated. Indeterminacy, on this view, is not accidental but structurally embedded within how worlds, and truths, are related.

Against this philosophical backdrop, Nigeria’s religious landscape was undergoing its own radical transformation. From the 1970s onward, and with particular intensity in the 1990s, the Pentecostal movement reshaped Christian discourse through the rise of the Prosperity Gospel. This theology proclaims wealth, health, and success not as contingent outcomes but as divinely guaranteed entitlements activated through faith, verbal declaration, and sacrificial giving. As Matthews Ojo observes, Nigerian Christianity increasingly shifted its eschatological gaze away from the afterlife toward an emphatic preoccupation with material flourishing in the present world. Central to this shift is the practice of “Positive Confession,” a linguistic regime employed by influential figures in the Christian faith, in which utterance itself is treated as causally efficacious.

When viewed through a Kripkean lens, this theological rhetoric raises profound semantic and philosophical questions. Do proclamations of guaranteed prosperity function as necessary truths across all accessible worlds, or do they occupy a liminal space where empirical falsification is perpetually deferred? If a believer’s declaration fails to correspond with lived reality, is the proposition false, or does it retreat into a truth-value gap sustained by appeals to insufficient faith, future fulfilment, or hidden divine conditions? The intersection of truth-value gaps and Prosperity Gospel discourse thus reveals a critical terrain where modal semantics, religious language, and socio-economic realities collide, demanding philosophical scrutiny beyond the comforts of either logic or theology alone.

### **Modal Logic and the Faith-State**

The intersection of Modal Logic and the Prosperity Gospel in Nigeria offers a profound framework for understanding how faith-based rhetoric restructures a believer's perception of reality. In the Nigerian Pentecostal context, language is not merely descriptive; it is performative and ontological.

In modal logic, a *possible world* ( $w$ ) denotes a complete way reality might have been, structured by internally coherent conditions of truth, necessity, and possibility. Saul Kripke’s semantic framework makes a decisive distinction between the *actual world* ( $w_0$ ); the world that is the case, and other accessible worlds that describe how things could be otherwise (Kripke, 1980). When this framework is transposed into the religious imagination of Nigerian Pentecostalism, particularly within the Prosperity Gospel, it becomes evident that theological meaning is constructed through a modal displacement of actuality. The lived socio-economic realities of inflation, unemployment, and structural precarity that characterize  $w_0$  in Nigeria are not denied outright, but are rhetorically demoted to a provisional or inferior ontological status.

Within this theological logic, the *Faith-State* functions as a privileged possible world ( $w_f$  meaning the faith-world), one in which the believer is already wealthy, healthy, and victorious. Access to this world is not mediated by empirical verification but by confession, ritualized speech, and affective certainty. As Okwunodu Ogbu (2007) observes, “Pentecostalism in Africa is a map of the universe where the supernatural is the most real dimension of human existence” (p. 23). The supernatural, in this sense, does not merely supplement material reality; it reorders the hierarchy of worlds, granting  $w_f$  greater epistemic authority than  $w_0$ . Faith thus becomes a modal operator, analogous to necessity that determines which propositions are to be treated as true, irrespective of empirical contradiction.

This reconfiguration gives rise to what may be described as *truth-value gaps* within the believer’s cognitive economy. In philosophical semantics, a truth-value gap arises when a proposition is neither true nor false due to failed presuppositions (Strawson, 1950). In the Prosperity Gospel context, the proposition ‘I am rich’ is insulated from falsification by the believer’s empty bank account. The empirical conditions that would ordinarily negate the claim are suspended, because the relevant truth conditions are indexed not to  $w_0$  but to  $w_f$ . As Gifford (2004) aptly notes, African Pentecostalism “relocates causality from structural conditions to spiritual laws” (p. 170), thereby neutralizing the dissonance between promise and experience.

Consequently, the believer is instructed, implicitly and explicitly, to ignore the semantic tension between present lack and promised abundance. The gap between reality and rhetoric is not resolved but bypassed through a modal shift in reference. What matters is not whether wealth is actual, but whether it is *possible* and *declared* within the faith-world. In this sense, the Prosperity Gospel in Nigeria operates as a lived modal metaphysics, one in which hope is sustained by treating the possible as more real than the actual, and where faith functions as the bridge that collapses contradiction without ever truly confronting it.

### **Truth-Value Gaps and Unfulfilled Prophecy**

The language of the Prosperity Gospel, particularly within contemporary Nigerian Pentecostalism, operates in a philosophically ambiguous space where theological promise, logical form, and lived experience frequently diverge. When a ‘seed’ is sown but no harvest materializes, the reassuring proclamation that ‘God is blessing you’ enters what analytic philosophy would describe as a logical grey zone, neither straightforwardly true nor demonstrably false, but suspended in semantic indeterminacy.

From the standpoint of the problem of non-denoting terms, the claim ‘your miracle is coming’ raises a classical Fregean and Strawsonian puzzle. If ‘your miracle’ does not correspond to any identifiable state of affairs in the actual world, the statement lacks a concrete referent. Frege held that for a sentence to bear a truth value, its constituent terms must successfully refer (Frege, 1892/1952). Strawson radicalized this insight by arguing that where presuppositions fail, truth-value attribution collapses altogether. His famous example, “The present King of France is bald”, is neither true nor false because its subject does not exist (Strawson, 1950, p. 330). Analogously, when promised prosperity never manifests, the claim “your miracle is coming” arguably falls into a truth-value gap: it is insulated from falsification precisely because its referent never stabilizes within empirical reality.

This presuppositional fragility is further reinforced in Prosperity theology through conditional faith clauses. Drawing on Strawson and later Kripkean semantics, one may argue that prosperity claims implicitly presuppose sufficient faith, obedience, or spiritual alignment. When these background conditions are retrospectively judged as unmet, the original statement loses evaluability. As Kripke observes, “a statement may fail to be true or false if the conditions required for its evaluation are not satisfied” (Kripke, 1972/1980, p. 24). Thus, failure is reinterpreted not as doctrinal error but as presupposition failure, allowing the promise to remain semantically intact while the believer absorbs the burden of non-actualization.

Kripke’s celebrated distinction between epistemic and metaphysical necessity further clarifies how prosperity discourse resists empirical disconfirmation. Epistemic necessity concerns what we know *a priori* or *a posteriori*, while metaphysical necessity concerns what could not have been otherwise. In

Prosperity theology, the assertion ‘God is good’ functions as a metaphysically necessary truth, true in all possible worlds, even when empirical data such as poverty, unemployment, or illness appear to contradict it. Kripke famously demonstrated that some truths, like ‘Water is H<sub>2</sub>O,’ are *a posteriori* yet metaphysically necessary (Kripke, 1980, p. 140). Similarly, within the Prosperity framework, God’s goodness is treated as necessarily true, discovered through revelation rather than refuted by experience. Empirical suffering is thus relegated to epistemic limitation rather than metaphysical counterexample.

Counterfactual reasoning plays a crucial immunizing role here. Prosperity preachers routinely invoke statements such as ‘If you had more faith, the breakthrough would have come,’ which are classic counterfactuals, claims about what would have happened under unrealized conditions. As Lewis notes, counterfactuals are notoriously resistant to verification because they appeal to non-actual possible worlds (Lewis, 1973, p. 1). By shifting explanatory force to hypothetical faith states, Prosperity discourse ensures that no actual outcome can definitively falsify the doctrine. Failure becomes evidence not against the promise but against the believer’s counterfactual spiritual condition.

Kripke’s causal theory of reference adds a further linguistic layer to this analysis. According to Kripke, the meaning of a term is not fixed by descriptions alone but by a historical causal chain tracing back to an initial ‘baptism’ of the term (Kripke, 1980, p. 91). In the case of Prosperity theology, biblical concepts such as blessing, abundance, and prosperity originate within ancient religious texts where they often signified covenantal wellbeing or spiritual flourishing. Through charismatic leaders and global Pentecostal networks, these terms undergo semantic drift. The reference of “prosperity” subtly shifts from holistic wellbeing to material affluence, even while retaining biblical authority through the causal chain of transmission.

This linguistic mutation is intensified in the doctrine of ‘positive confession,’ where speech is treated as ontologically creative. To ‘name’ a blessing is to call it into existence, echoing Kripke’s insight that naming establishes reference. However, in Prosperity practice, naming is not merely referential but performative. The utterance ‘I receive my miracle’ is treated as a metaphysical act that baptizes a future state of affairs into one’s personal reality. Yet without empirical anchoring, such baptized references risk remaining empty names, terms with causal pedigree but no instantiated referent.

In sum, Prosperity Gospel language survives logical and empirical strain by inhabiting truth-value gaps, exploiting presupposition failure, and leveraging Kripkean distinctions between necessity, reference, and counterfactual possibility. What emerges is not merely a theological system but a sophisticated semantic structure, one in which meaning is preserved even as material fulfillment perpetually recedes.

### **The Semantics of “Seed-Faith” as a Proposition**

The semantics of ‘seed-faith’ preaching, when treated as a proposition rather than a devotional utterance, exposes deep logical tensions that are best illuminated through Kripkean semantics and contemporary philosophy of language. Framed propositionally, seed-faith claims purport to assert conditions under which material prosperity follows sacrificial giving. Yet, as with many religious performatives, their truth-conditions are rarely made explicit. The proposed acronym SEMANTIC- Semantic Sequent, Inversion Principle, and Completeness Theorem; provides a conceptual scaffold for interrogating how such claims oscillate between assertoric propositions and unfalsifiable assurances, thereby generating truth-value gaps.

At the level of semantic sequent, seed-faith preaching implicitly relies on conditional promises of the form *If you sow, then you will reap*. In propositional logic, this structure is straightforwardly rendered as  $P \rightarrow Q$ , where P denotes the act of giving (the “seed”) and Q denotes the promised outcome (wealth, breakthrough, or prosperity). Classical semantics is unambiguous here: a conditional is false when the antecedent is true and the consequent false. As Tarski (1944) insists, “the meaning of a sentence is determined by the conditions under which it is true” (p. 344). Empirically, however, Nigerian prosperity preaching routinely encounters situations where congregants give sacrificially while remaining in

poverty. Under standard truth-conditions, such cases render the proposition false. Yet the system resists this verdict, revealing a semantic instability rather than a coherent logical framework.

This resistance becomes clearer when examined through the inversion principle, a pragmatic manoeuvre whereby the burden of falsification is reversed. Instead of allowing the failure of Q to negate the truth of  $P \rightarrow Q$ , the preacher reinterprets the antecedent: the seed was “not enough,” the faith was ‘impure,’ or the timing was ‘not divine.’ This resembles what Popper (1959) famously criticized as immunizing strategies, where theories are protected from refutation by ad hoc adjustments. In semantic terms, the original proposition is no longer preserved; it is inverted so that empirical failure never counts against the claim. Kripke’s insight that meaning depends on fixed conditions across possible worlds becomes relevant here: “A possible world is a way the world might have been” (Kripke, 1980, p. 18). If in the actual world ( $w_0$ ) faithful giving does not yield wealth, then either the proposition is false in  $w_0$ , or it lacks determinate truth-conditions altogether.

The problem intensifies with what may be called semantic flexibility, the strategic redefinition of ‘prosperity’ mid-argument. When material wealth fails to materialize, prosperity is redescribed as ‘peace of mind,’ ‘spiritual growth,’ or ‘future blessings.’ This semantic shift avoids falsity by altering the consequent Q after the antecedent P has been satisfied. Strawson’s theory of presupposition is instructive here: when a presupposition fails, “the question of truth or falsity does not arise” (Strawson, 1950, p. 330). In seed-faith discourse, however, the presupposition itself is not allowed to fail; instead, it is retroactively redefined. The result is not a true proposition but a truth-value gap, where the statement is neither clearly true nor clearly false because its semantic content is unstable.

From a Kripkean perspective, the completeness problem becomes unavoidable. A semantic system is complete only if every well-formed proposition is assigned a truth-value relative to a model. Yet seed-faith propositions resist completeness because their models are perpetually revised. As Haack (1978) notes, “where meaning shifts with convenience, logical evaluation collapses into rhetoric” (p. 137). The faith-world ( $w_f$ ) is invoked as superior to the actual world, but its accessibility relation is never clearly specified. Without fixed accessibility conditions, no modal evaluation of necessity or possibility can succeed.

In sum, the semantics of seed-faith preaching reveals a system that mimics logical form while evading logical accountability. Conditional promises are asserted, inverted, and semantically reconfigured to avoid falsity, producing a persistent truth-value gap. When evaluated through Kripke’s possible-world semantics and classical theories of truth, seed-faith propositions function less as truth-apt statements and more as performative assurances, rhetorically powerful, but semantically indeterminate. As Frege cautioned, “to ask for the meaning of a sentence is to ask for its truth-conditions” (Frege, 1918/1956, p. 299); where such conditions are endlessly deferred, meaning itself becomes elusive.

### **Fixed Conditional Form: Restoring Logical Clarity**

The foundational move of the SEMANTIC model lies in its insistence that the logical form of seed-faith preaching be rendered explicit rather than rhetorically suggestive. In ordinary sermonic discourse, the statement “*If you sow, you will reap*” is presented as a simple conditional, yet it tacitly suppresses a network of auxiliary assumptions, most notably, the sufficiency of faith, the correctness of the recipient’s spiritual posture, and the semantic stability of divine promise. When these presuppositions remain unarticulated, the statement functions less as a proposition and more as what J. L. Austin would call a *performative utterance*, insulated from truth-evaluation by its pragmatic context (Austin, 1962).

By formalizing the claim as:  $(P \bullet S) \rightarrow Q$

This is a material conditional whose antecedent is a conjunction. Formally:

- P: the act of sowing (e.g., financial giving)
- S: satisfaction of supplementary spiritual conditions (faith sufficiency, obedience, correct posture)
- Q: the promised outcome (prosperity, blessing, breakthrough)

The connective “dot·” is logical conjunction, and “→” is the classical material conditional, defined truth-functionally as:  $A \rightarrow B \equiv \neg A \vee B$

Hence,

$$(P \bullet S) \rightarrow Q \equiv \neg(P \bullet S) \vee Q$$

By De Morgan’s Law:  $\neg(P \bullet S) \equiv (\neg P \vee \neg S)$

So, the model is equivalent to:  $(\neg P \vee \neg S) \vee Q$

This equivalence already reveals a critical semantic insight: the promise fails only in one precise logical circumstance, namely when P and S are both true while Q is false. The claim involves three independent propositional variables:  $P, S, Q$ . In classical propositional logic: Each atomic proposition has two possible truth-values: True (1) or False (0). With  $n$  independent propositions, the total number of possible valuations is:  $2^n$

Since the SEMANTIC model contains three atomic propositions:  $2^3=8$ . Thus, there are eight logically exhaustive and mutually exclusive truth-value assignments. These are not rhetorical possibilities; they are mathematically unavoidable consequences of the logical structure of the claim. The SEMANTIC model compels semantic transparency. Here, **P** denotes the act of sowing (financial or symbolic giving), **S** represents the satisfaction of supplementary spiritual conditions (faith adequacy, obedience, correct intention), and **Q** signifies the promised outcome (material blessing, breakthrough, or prosperity). This reformulation exposes the fact that the original sermonic conditional was incomplete. As Gottlob Frege famously observed, “a sentence does not yet express a thought unless the presuppositions for its truth have been fulfilled” (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 191). Without **S**, the proposition lacks determinate truth conditions.

The logical power of the fixed conditional becomes evident when subjected to a classical truth-functional analysis. The truth table for  $(P \bullet S) \rightarrow Q$  is as follows:

<b>P (Sowing)</b>	<b>S (Spiritual Conditions)</b>	<b>Q (Reaping)</b>	$(P \bullet S)$	$(P \bullet S) \rightarrow Q$
T	T	T	T	<b>T</b>
T	T	F	T	<b>F</b>
T	F	T	F	<b>T</b>
T	F	F	F	<b>T</b>
F	T	T	F	<b>T</b>
F	T	F	F	<b>T</b>
F	F	T	F	<b>T</b>
F	F	F	F	<b>T</b>

This table restores logical discipline to the sermonic claim. The conditional is false only when both sowing (P) and the required spiritual conditions (S) are satisfied, yet the promised outcome (Q) fails to materialize. In all other cases, classical logic assigns the conditional a truth value of *true*, not because

the promise is fulfilled, but because the antecedent fails. This is a crucial distinction often obscured in prosperity preaching.

As Bertrand Russell cautions, “implication in formal logic is not a causal guarantee but a relation of truth-values” (Russell, 1919, p. 35). The failure to appreciate this distinction allows preachers to retroactively redefine failure as evidence that *S* was never met, thereby immunizing the claim against falsification.

By making auxiliary premises explicit, the SEMANTIC model aligns with Alfred Tarski’s classical semantic principle that “the meaning of a sentence is determined by the conditions under which it is true” (Tarski, 1944, p. 344). Once these truth conditions are specified, the proposition becomes truth-apt, meaning it can genuinely be evaluated as true or false within a logical system. Prior to this formalization, the sermonic conditional remains what Karl Popper would describe as *methodologically irrefutable*, a statement structured so that no conceivable observation counts against it (Popper, 1963).

Moreover, this fixed conditional form curtails what P. F. Strawson identifies as *presuppositional evasion*. Strawson argues that when presuppositions fail, speakers often shift responsibility away from the proposition itself, claiming instead that it was “misapplied” (Strawson, 1950). In seed-faith discourse, this manifests when unmet promises are blamed on hidden spiritual deficits rather than on the falsity of the claim. By embedding these presuppositions into the antecedent ( $P \bullet S$ ), the SEMANTIC model prevents such evasions.

The reformulation of seed-faith preaching into a fixed conditional form represents a decisive move from rhetorical elasticity to logical clarity. It transforms a spiritually charged slogan into a formally assessable proposition, subject to truth tables, falsifiability, and semantic evaluation. In doing so, it honours the core insight of analytic philosophy that clarity is not the enemy of faith but the prerequisite of meaningful assertion. As Tarski insists, only when truth conditions are explicit can language escape ambiguity and achieve semantic integrity (Tarski, 1944).

## Conclusion

This study has argued that truth-value gaps are not merely technical anomalies within formal logic but philosophically revealing sites where language, reality, and power intersect. Beginning from Aristotle’s reflections on future contingents, the essay traced a lineage of thought in which bivalence repeatedly proves insufficient to account for propositions whose truth cannot be settled by appeal to the actual world alone. Frege’s analysis of sense and reference, Strawson’s theory of presupposition, and Kripke’s possible-worlds semantics collectively demonstrate that meaningful discourse can fail to be truth-apt without thereby becoming meaningless. Truth-value gaps thus emerge as indicators of semantic strain, moments where linguistic assertion outruns ontological grounding.

When this philosophical apparatus is brought to bear on the Nigerian Prosperity Gospel, its critical force becomes unmistakable. Prosperity preaching does not simply make empirical claims about wealth and success; it constructs a modal ontology in which the actual world is subordinated to a privileged faith-world. Within this framework, declarations of prosperity are insulated from falsification by being indexed to non-actual possible worlds, counterfactual faith-states, or indefinitely deferred futures. As a result, failed promises are neither admitted as false nor abandoned as erroneous; instead, they persist within truth-value gaps sustained by appeals to insufficient faith, hidden conditions, or divine timing. This semantic manoeuvring allows the doctrine to retain rhetorical authority while evading logical accountability.

The analysis of unfulfilled prophecy and non-denoting religious terms further revealed how Prosperity discourse exploits presuppositional fragility. Claims such as “your miracle is coming” or “you are already blessed” often lack stable referents in the actual world, yet they continue to function as meaningful utterances precisely because their truth-conditions are never allowed to crystallize.

Strawson's insight that failed presuppositions suspend truth-evaluation proves especially illuminating here, as does Kripke's distinction between epistemic limitation and metaphysical necessity. God's goodness is treated as necessary across all possible worlds; while suffering and poverty are relegated to contingent or epistemically opaque deviations. In this way, semantic indeterminacy is not accidental but structurally embedded within the theology itself.

The introduction of the SEMANTIC model represents the constructive philosophical contribution of this essay. By formalizing seed-faith preaching into a fixed conditional form, the model exposes the hidden assumptions that ordinarily shield prosperity claims from scrutiny. Rendering the promise as  $(P \bullet S) \rightarrow Q$  makes explicit the auxiliary spiritual conditions that are typically smuggled in after the fact. The resulting truth-table analysis demonstrates that only one precise configuration renders the conditional false, thereby restoring logical clarity to a discourse that thrives on semantic elasticity. In line with Tarski's classical conception of truth and Popper's criterion of falsifiability, the SEMANTIC model shows that meaningful assertion requires determinate truth-conditions. Where such conditions are endlessly revised, meaning collapses into rhetoric.

More broadly, this inquiry underscores that philosophical analysis of religious language is neither hostile to faith nor reducible to skepticism. Rather, it affirms the analytic insight that clarity is an ethical as well as a logical virtue. In socio-economic contexts marked by precarity, the cost of semantic indeterminacy is borne not by doctrines but by believers whose hopes are repeatedly deferred without acknowledgment of failure. By identifying truth-value gaps and insisting on semantic transparency, philosophy performs a critical function: it reveals how language can sustain hope while obscuring responsibility.

In conclusion, the intersection of truth-value gaps, Kripkean modal semantics, and Nigerian Prosperity theology exposes a sophisticated but troubling semantic economy. Seed-faith propositions mimic the form of logical conditionals while systematically evading the discipline of truth-evaluation. The SEMANTIC model offers a way of interrupting this evasion by forcing hidden presuppositions into the open and subjecting religious claims to the same standards of clarity demanded in any other domain of rational discourse. As Frege observed, to inquire into meaning is ultimately to inquire into truth (Frege, 1918/1956). Where truth is indefinitely postponed, philosophy must ask not only what is believed, but how belief is made logically invulnerable, and at what human cost.

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