

IBN Rasha's Rational Approach to the Problems of Existence

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Abstract: This article deals with the philosophical teachings of Ibn Rushd, repeating that the enlightenment teachings of the scholar were put forward in the context of the medieval religious fanaticism.

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Ibn Rushd's view that it is futile and even harmful to fight against theological colleagues on any front is also reflected in the aspirations of the progressive thinkers of his time. In order to achieve the main goal, it was necessary to give an explanation to the entity in such a way that it was necessary to put aside the interference of religious aspects as much as possible. The struggle to liberate the being from the influence of supernatural forces has been waged on many fronts. However, as one of the important issues in it, according to the supporters of scientific knowledge, whose opponents are theologians, the issue of the world's wound and its eternity is recognized. Foresight Ghazali was able to assess the importance of this problem in his work "Refuting Philosophers". He asserts that the recognition of the eternity of the universe and the admission of infinite natural consequences from it renders the hypothesis of a "first cause" redundant, as it leads mainly to dharrism (irreligiousness).

Three different interpretations can be distinguished from Ibn Rushd's arguments in favor of the uncreation of the universe. It is based on controversial evidence used to defend the teaching of Eastern orators who rely on the figurative interpretation of the Qur'an against the criticism of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and the theologians of the school of al-Ash'ar.

The first way of interpretation is not so interesting because it repeats Stagiri's proof. This method is characteristic of Ibn Rushd's interpretation of Aristotle's works, especially the books "Physics" and "On Creation and Cessation" and "Metaphysics". On the contrary, although the second method is interesting because of Ibn Rushd's "apodeictic" way of thinking, it actually represents a metaphorical interpretation of the solution to this important worldview issue. With this type of "proof" we come across in the work "Considerations advanced for resolution" based on the "analysis" of the Qur'anic verses related to the creation of the universe. It is emphasized that here only the change of the form of the universe, which will be infinite in the past of existence, is discussed. According to Ibn Rushd's confession, the verses in the Qur'an, "He is such that He created the heavens and the earth together in six days, and His kingdom was in the waters" presupposes "some kind of being that follows this being", that is, it refers to the infinity of existence, "... on that day the kurrai-zamin will be exchanged for another Earth..." or, in other words, it assumes that the universe will not disappear in the future.

This kind of "unsound" proof of the eternal and immortality of existence is obvious, but, of course, Ibn Rushd did not even try to use the debates between theologians and himself in the pages of his work "The Denial of the Denial". In the acclaimed book, we encounter a third method of interpretation, which is of some historical-philosophical interest. The chapters devoted

to the discussion of this issue occupy four parts of this fundamental work, which allows us to present the existing debate in it in a somewhat simple and structured form.

The debate between the two authors of the Denial includes the arguments of Eastern philosophers, the negative interpretations and reasons of al-Ghazali and (the Ash'arites) who claim the validity of Ibn Rushd's last comments. The four proofs of the eternity of the universe studied by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in his book "Refuting the Philosophers" are debated.

The first proof

Philosophers deny the possibility that anything that has its own beginning can arise from some eternal principle. If the universe had been created, then there must have been something that determined its coming into existence, or else it would have remained unchanged in its state of pure possibility; and at the same time it may be asked of such a determinative origin: did it become somehow new or different during its creation? If not, then the universe would continue to exist in a state of pure possibility; if so, then one might ask about this determinative origin: by what other determinant is the transition of the universe into its new state at creation, and why does it occur at this moment and not at some other moment of absolute equal value in terms of the possibility of creating moments of time?

Ghazali raises his own two-pronged objection to this proof. First, he says, one might ask the philosophers: on what basis did they contend with the idea that some eternal will determined that the universe came into existence exactly when it did? From the point of view of theologians, in the same case, philosophers, although in fact it is not here, claim based on a certain axiom, because it is recognized by many others. Nevertheless, people who believe that the universe was created over a long period of time make up the majority. Philosophers, on the other hand, quite contrary to the law, equate the eternal will of God with the finite will of men, which is behind the creation of the object of desire. Second, philosophers are forced to admit that the universe originated in ancient times, although they know that there is a causal relationship in it that cannot produce regress.

Ibn Rushd, while rejecting Ghazali's emphasis on universally accepted religious beliefs that the world was created according to the will of God, points out that the condition of authenticity of a certain situation does not consist in the recognition by all people. As for the essence of Ghazali's objections, the first of them has a purely Sufi classification: since Ghazali could not confirm the possibility of the result of the action being behind the act (action) of the free-willed mover and his decision to act. He stated that the result of his action may lag behind the will of the mover, but the whole point is that the result of the move cannot lag behind the moving act itself. The main flaw in this reasoning is that when it talks about the "will" that religion considers to belong to God, it assumes that the will of man is similar to it. In his second objection, al-Ghazali rejects the argument that all things that have a beginning pass through the sphere of the heavens through time through circular motion, but that this motion is continuous and ever-renewing.

The second proof

Philosophers say that it is permissible to understand that God essentially created the universe, since he existed before the universe and time, because otherwise there would have been a time that had neither a beginning nor an end to the creation of the universe and its movement of time, which in fact could not be the case. If time, which represents the measure of motion, must be eternal, then eternity must be inherent in the thing that moves, namely the universe. Finally, the eternity of the universe comes from the fact that, from a theological point of view, God was able to create the universe an infinite number of years before he created it, and to deny this fact would be to deny the power of an omnipotent God.

Al-Ghazali objects to this: the expression that God is before the world and time should be understood in the sense that God first existed without the world and time, and then he existed together with the world and time. It would be a mistake to assume, in the feeble imagination of man who considers himself the beginning of something, a time in the uncreated universe,

alongside God, a "before" that is not earlier than something, that is, time. When an empty space outside the universe is assumed, one can indulge in such a crude imagination, since it is inconceivable, and therefore coherence is considered an important attribute (property) of matter. Similar errors of imagination arise, and the last proof of the philosophers, therefore, by comparison of time and space, is easily refuted: for God would make the circle of this luminous universe a cubit or two larger or smaller than its existing state, and this imitation would be infinitely more could create? If the philosophers say, "He could not create," they would be denying God's great power, and if they say, "He did," then they would be referring to some figure in the void, but that would be impermanence, because the void means nothing.

First of all, Ibn Rushd points out that all debates about timelessness and consistency are futile. Since eternity is not specific to time, the existence of the universe is specific to it. This situation does not surprise the philosophers, who hold that the moving world is completely without its beginning, and they can show how that which has its beginning can come from eternity. If we talk about the comparison of time and space, then this will not be possible, because, unlike matter, time and motion do not have a state and do not form a whole.

The third proof

Philosophers have insisted that if the universe could be eternal, then the universe has always existed, that is, it would never have been impossible; if it were assumed that the possibility of its existence had not had its beginning, then it would have resulted in such a recognition of time that according to it the universe could not have existed, and in turn this opinion would have been equivalent to the recognition of God as impotent.

Ghazali admits the hypothetical possibility of the creation of the universe at any point in time, and he also admits that the beginning of the universe did not begin at any point in time. Therefore, the reality does not match the possibility. In the same way, there is no limit to the possibility of some body, then another body, and the same other bodies joining the existing universe, and in this way it approaches infinity, but it does not assume the existence of an absolutely filled infinite space.

Ibn Rushd compares the opinion of those who conclude about the eternity of the world from the only possibility according to the amount of the world's occurrence with Ghazali's opinion about the infinite possibilities according to the amount of the world. According to al-Ghazali's view of the infinite number of possibilities in the universe, if this were allowed, it would turn them into a single entity and lead to an absurd conclusion: the existing universe was a part of some other universe, etc., and then it was either a single universe forever would have ended as, or else would have faced absurd infinity. If we must break this line, it is best to do so in the world around us.

The fourth proof

Philosophers believed that any object was nothing (existed) before it came into being, or nothing could be, or was necessary (existed). It is not possible for a subject to be non-existent, because the impossibility itself does not exist at all; it cannot be a necessary truth, that is, a necessary thing cannot not exist at all; so this item probably exists. As long as there is no substrate other than matter that can combine with this possibility, then primordial matter can never come into being.

Ghazali denies this proof of the philosophers' arguments that if possibility serves as an attribute in objective reality, it is nothing more than a concept of thinking. In particular, how could possibility be possibility if it felt the need for something, since impossibility would need such a clearly existing substrate.

exposes the naivety of al-Ghazali's reasoning, which tried to refute the arguments presented by philosophers in favor of the eternity of matter using nominalist arguments. "This is a Sufi reasoning, that since possibility is a universal like other universals, then there are single things that exist outside the mind, and knowledge is not the knowledge of general concepts, but is produced by the mind when it deduces from the single things the various inter-matter distributive

natures common to them. the only thing that comes out is knowing.' What is admitted about the nature of possibilities is also true about all other real conceptions of thought. Therefore, reality, as its description affirms, exists in the soul as it exists outside the soul. For this reason, Ghazali's interpretation of impossibility being transformed into crude fantasy by some substratum is also unfounded.

In the final part of his above-mentioned argument, Ibn Rushd argues precisely for the future infinite existence of the universe. The basis of the interpretation is the thesis. According to him, all things that have a beginning also have an end, and all things without a beginning are infinite.

The ideas of researchers of Ibn Rushd's work about the eternity of the universe in the work "Negation of the Negation" are recognized not only by European philosophers of the Middle Ages, but also of the New Era (including the debate between Clarke and Leibniz, Kant's antinomy, etc.).

In this case, the possibility of influence cannot be claimed, because the Latin translation of both "Negation", according to L. Goethe, "was in the hands of all intelligent thinkers at that time." However, the main thing here is that Ibn Rushd and Ghazali covered various aspects of the problems of encyclopedicity (which includes a wide field of knowledge) of the proof of the eternity of the universe, accumulated in the history of philosophy since the time of Aristotle, apparently.

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